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AN EXAMINATION OF NEW YORK’S 
MARTIN ACT AS A TOOL TO COMBAT 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
ASHLEY POON* 
Abstract: Environmental statutes and regulations in the United States have 
largely failed to comprehensively control the human activities that cause cli-
mate change. This Note examines a novel approach to the matter in the form 
of an investigation led by New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman to 
discover how ExxonMobil incorporates its climate change research into its 
corporate governance, accounting, and business planning. Schneiderman’s in-
vestigation relies on the New York securities fraud statute, the Martin Act, to 
determine if the company has internally reached one conclusion about climate 
change in its research while promoting another to investors. ExxonMobil ini-
tially cooperated with the Attorney General’s investigation, but the company 
has since struck back. The battle now involves two lawsuits, many cross-
subpoenas, nearly half the country’s Attorneys General, and at least one feder-
al agency. This Note chronicles the history of the Martin Act, a parallel model 
of litigation in Attorneys’ General attacks on Big Tobacco, and outlines the 
current status of Schneiderman’s investigation and parallel litigation. 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 4, 2015, New York Attorney General Eric Schneider-
man launched an investigation into ExxonMobil to determine if the oil and 
gas company committed fraud regarding climate change in its annual re-
ports, public statements made by executives to the press, and newspaper 
advertisements.1 A spokesman from Schneiderman’s office said the investi-
gations would determine if the company violated New York’s securities, 
business, and consumer fraud laws by publicly mischaracterizing the cer-
tainty of climate change research and the effect of this research on the com-
pany’s strategy.2 In August 2016, Schneiderman revealed that the inquiry 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Comment Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 
2016–2017. 
 1 See Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, ExxonMobil Investigated for Possible Climate Change 
Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/
06/science/exxon-mobil-under-investigation-in-new-york-over-climate-statements.html [https://
perma.cc/AXW4-6KRV]. 
 2 Matthew Daly, House GOP Subpoenas NY, Mass. AGs on Climate Change Probe, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY (July 13, 2016, 8:14 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/0ee0825afde
64a4f8fb4fa78f5d76e9b/house-gop-subpoenas-ny-mass-ags-climate-change-probe [https://perma.
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focused on ExxonMobil’s more recent statements—such as a 2014 report 
assessing global energy demand and supply, climate change policy, and car-
bon asset risk—regarding its climate change predictions and requisite im-
pact on the company’s strategy.3  
The Martin Act (“the Act”) provides the New York Attorney General 
with a uniquely powerful tool in pursuing corporate fraud because of the 
Act’s strong investigative power and its joint civil and criminal penalties.4 
Through its investigation into ExxonMobil, Schneiderman’s office will ana-
lyze whether the company’s external statements conflict with the its internal 
findings, thereby preventing investors from making informed investment 
decisions.5 The conflict, if any, would violate the Act, which prohibits all 
deception or fraud related to the sale of securities.6  
The New York Attorney General’s office began looking into Exx-
onMobil a year before the first subpoena was issued.7 The investigation 
likely hinges on the Martin Act, New York’s securities fraud law.8 To 
demonstrate a violation of the Act, the Attorney General must show that the 
                                                                                                                           
cc/Z8TM-3JTG]; Sarah N. Lynch, Exxon Taps High-profile Lawyer to Fight N.Y. Climate Change 
Probe, REUTERS (Dec. 1, 2015, 5:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxon-probe-climate
change-idUSKBN0TK5RR20151201 [https://perma.cc/7QWC-WV8H]. In early December 2015, 
ExxonMobil hired Paul Weiss’ litigation co-chair Theodore V. Wells, Jr. in anticipation of the 
investigation. Lynch, supra. Wells is a high-profile litigator who worked on behalf of the National 
Football League during the New England Patriots’ “deflategate” scandal. Id. 
 3 John Schwartz, ExxonMobil Fraud Inquiry Said to Focus More on Future Than Past, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/science/exxon-mobil-fraud-inquiry-
said-to-focus-more-on-future-than-past.html [https://perma.cc/9ZCA-LXVM]. Schneiderman said 
“it is a civil fraud case,” and noted that criminal charges could be filed if the investigation reveals 
evidence of criminal actions. Id. 
 4 See Aaron A. Tidman, Securities Law Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century: Why States 
Are Better Equipped Than the Securities and Exchange Commission to Enforce Securities Law, 57 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 379, 391 (2007). 
 5 Gillis & Krauss, supra note 1. 
 6 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2016); Lincoln Caplan, Will the “Tobacco Strate-
gy” Work Against Big Oil?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/will-the-tobacco-strategy-work-against-big-oil [https://perma.cc/2YDR-L385]. In 2007, 
for the first time since the 1980s, ExxonMobil publicly admitted that climate change was occur-
ring and was largely a result of burning fossil fuels. Katie Jennings, Dino Grandoni & Susanne 
Rust, How Exxon Went from Leader to Skeptic on Climate Change, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015), 
http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-research/ [https://perma.cc/9CMF-ZSND]. New York courts 
have held that the applicable statute of limitations for the Martin Act is six years. Loengard v. 
Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. 1987); Podraza v. Carriero, 630 N.Y.S.2d 163, 
169 (App. Div. 1995); State v. Bronxville Glen I Assocs., 581 N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (App. Div. 
1992). The Supreme Court of New York has held that a new cause of action accrues for each ac-
tion that purportedly violated the Martin Act. State v. 7040 Colonial Rd. Assocs. Co., 671 
N.Y.S.2d 938, 944 (App. Div. 1998). Schneiderman will need to show that ExxonMobil’s last 
violation of the Martin Act occurred within six years of the date he commences an action. See 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 213 (McKinney 2016); Podraza, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 169. 
 7 Gillis & Krauss, supra note 1. 
 8 Id. 
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defendant committed fraud “in connection with the sale of securities and 
commodities,” and that fraud deceived or misled investors.9 
Schneiderman’s investigation was prompted, in part, by investigative 
reporting from InsideClimate News and the Los Angeles Times.10 An eight-
month investigation conducted by InsideClimate News tracked ExxonMo-
bil’s early climate change research in the 1970s, and concluded that the 
company contradicted itself by later funding research denying climate 
change in order to promote its business.11 The Los Angeles Times uncovered 
how ExxonMobil pioneered climate change research in the 1980s and close-
ly studied how climate change impacts the company’s strategy—affirming 
the certainty of its existence—while simultaneously establishing a public 
policy that questioned this certainty because of the negative impact poten-
tial legislation and regulation would have on business.12 
In September 2016, Schneiderman’s office expanded its investigation 
of the company to scrutinize its accounting practices, specifically examin-
                                                                                                                           
 9 People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926). 
 10 Gillis & Krauss, supra note 1. The InsideClimate News and Los Angeles Times investiga-
tions focus on Exxon, which merged with Mobil Oil in 1999. See Exxon: The Road Not Taken, 
INSIDECLIMATE NEWS, http://insideclimatenews.org/content/Exxon-The-Road-Not-Taken [https://
perma.cc/N693-BZAD] (providing an overview of the InsideClimate News series investigating 
Exxon); The Energy and Environment Reporting Fellowship, COLUM. JOURNALISM SCH., http://
www.journalism.columbia.edu/page/1184-the-energy-and-environment-reporting-fellowship/8 
[http://perma.cc/9H6Q-GRUR] (detailing the collaboration between the Los Angeles Times and 
Columbia Journalism School’s Energy & Environment Fellowship Project to produce the investi-
gative series); Our History, EXXONMOBIL, http://exxonmobil.com/Benelux-English/about_who_
history.aspx [https://perma.cc/LD83-B3XJ]. In an August 2016 interview with The New York 
Times, Schneiderman said this research is not the focus of his investigation, but was “important to 
establish knowledge and the framework to look for inconsistencies.” Schwartz, supra note 3. 
 11 See Exxon: The Road Not Taken, supra note 10. 
 12 Jennings, Grandoni & Rust, supra note 6. ExxonMobil is the world’s largest publicly trad-
ed oil and gas company. About Us, EXXONMOBIL CORP., http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/
company/about-us [https://perma.cc/BJW4-LZ6E]. Burning oil and gas to create energy creates 
carbon dioxide emissions, which contributes to climate change. Overview of Greenhouse Gases, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://
perma.cc/QLH3-QZKB]. ExxonMobil expressed its public policy through newspaper advertising 
campaigns, public executive statements, and at the company’s shareholder meetings. See Sara 
Jerving et al., What Exxon Knew About the Earth’s Melting Arctic, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://
graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/ [https://perma.cc/P9VH-ZF3M]. In 1989, Exxon’s manager of 
science and strategy development, Duane LeVine, told the board of directors that “scientists gen-
erally agreed gases released by burning fossil fuels could raise global temperatures significantly 
by the middle of the 21st century.” Jennings, Grandoni & Rust, supra note 6. In April 2016, the 
Center for International Environmental Law published an extensive report showing that the oil 
industry was aware of climate change risks as far back as the 1960s. New Documents Reveal Oil 
Industry Knew of Climate Risks Decades Earlier Than Suspected; Suggest Coordinated Efforts to 
Foster Skepticism, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L. (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.ciel.org/news/smoke-
and-fumes/ [https://perma.cc/VZB3-6HQ5]. The report also uncovered a connection between the 
oil and tobacco industries, and showed that the two industries worked together to strategize ap-
proaches to policy. CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L., supra. 
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ing why ExxonMobil did not write-down the value of its oil and gas re-
serves on the company’s balance sheet when energy prices dropped.13 
Though ExxonMobil had cooperated with Schneiderman’s investigation for 
nearly a year, in October 2016 the company added Schneiderman to a law-
suit seeking to block the subpoena, claiming infringement of the company’s 
free speech rights.14 Schneiderman has repeatedly quipped that “the First 
Amendment doesn’t protect you for fraud.”15 Days after Schneiderman an-
nounced the expansion of his investigation into ExxonMobil’s accounting 
methods, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) opened its own 
investigation into how the company values its assets.16  
At the end of January 2017, ExxonMobil wrote down the value of 
more than two billion dollars in assets.17 This was the first time the compa-
ny booked such a decline since at least 1990.18 Less than a month later, in 
its annual 2016 report to the SEC, it “de-booked” a further 3.5 billion bar-
rels of oil reserves in an oil sands project in Canada.19 The company did not 
mention the investigations as motivation for these actions.20 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Bradley Olson, Exxon’s Accounting Practices Are Investigated, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 
2016, 5:53 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/exxons-accounting-practices-are-investigated-1474
018381 [https://perma.cc/W9ZA-X924]. A write-down is the readjustment of an asset’s value 
given internal or external circumstances that warrant a new valuation. Id. Since 2014, ExxonMo-
bil’s rivals in the energy industry have collectively written down their oil and gas asset values by 
two hundred billion dollars in light of lower crude oil and natural gas prices. Id. Lower fuel prices 
make the cost of tapping into oil and gas reserves more expensive to the point of being cost pro-
hibitive. Id. 
14 ExxonMobil Corporation’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Leave to 
File a First Amended Complaint at *7, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, No. 4:16-CV-469-K (N.D. 
Tex. 2016 Dec. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 6460416. ExxonMobil had produced more than 2.5 million 
pages of documents related to the investigation at the time of publication. Erin Ailworth, Exxon 
Rejects New York’s Accusations in Climate Case, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2016, 7:55 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-rejects-new-yorks-accusations-in-climate-case-1489717149 [https://
perma.cc/Z9ZX-P223]. 
 15 Schwartz, supra note 3. This line appears to have been inspired by a Supreme Court opin-
ion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, which held that the First Amendment does not protect fraudu-
lent statements or actions. See Letter from Richard A. Johnson, Chief Legal Counsel for Mass. 
Att’y Gen. Maura Healey, to Lamar Smith, Chairman, Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech. (July 26, 
2016), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/energy-utilities/exxon/ltr-to-congressman-lamar-smith-7-26-
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5D6J-U82Q]. 
 16 Bradley Olson & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Probes Exxon Over Accounting for Climate 
Change, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2017, 5:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-investigating-
exxon-on-valuing-of-assets-accounting-practices-1474393593 [http://perma.cc/4W7H-BV4J]. 
 17 Bradley Olson, Exxon Profit Tumbles on Charge; Revenue Rises, WALL ST. J., https://
www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-profit-tumbles-on-charge-revenue-rises-1485869562 [https://perma.
cc/H5S6-EQWM]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Geoffrey Smith, Exxon’s Big Oil Sands Write-Off Could Help It Dodge SEC Troubles, 
FORTUNE (Feb. 23, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/23/exxon-mobil-oil-sands-sec/ [https://
perma.cc/CM5P-HR86]. Writing down reserves and de-booking reserves are related but separate 
actions. Olson, supra note 13. Assigning a book value to oil or gas reserves, known as booking 
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Part I of this Note discusses the extraordinary discovery power the Act 
grants New York’s Attorney General, and demonstrates how the Act’s strong 
criminal and civil penalties induce corporations to comply with investiga-
tions.21 Part I of this Note also details former Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer’s powerful reforms of the financial services industry which were 
enabled by the Act and which may serve as a blueprint for Schneiderman’s 
attempted reform of climate change disclosures.22 Part II examines the ear-
lier national cooperative effort by states’ Attorneys General and Congress 
against Big Tobacco as a potential model for nationally comprehensive cli-
mate change litigation and legislation.23 Part III outlines theories behind 
investigations from Schneiderman and the SEC.24 Finally, Part IV traces the 
increasingly convoluted battle in the climate change debate.25 
I. THE MARTIN ACT: NEW YORK’S SECURITIES FRAUD STATUTE 
A. Attorneys General as Power Politicians: How the Martin Act  
Gained Its Strength 
The Martin Act (“the Act”) is unique today among state and federal se-
curities laws because of its investigatory strength, broad coverage, and the 
combined civil and criminal range of the authority it gives to the Attorney 
General.26 The statute, enacted in 1921, is New York’s blue sky law.27 Blue 
sky laws received their name because they were enacted to hinder and pros-
ecute fraud from securities sellers, who would defraud unknowing investors 
                                                                                                                           
reserves, involves expert opinions from engineers, geophysicists and geologists, who collectively 
decide if recent discoveries can be extracted in a cost-effective manner under current regulations. 
Id. De-booking refers to the formal recognition of the impact the falling value of a reserve will 
have on the company and is recorded as a charge to a company’s income statement. Id. The Fi-
nancial Accounting Standards Board, a non-governmental financial and reporting organization 
that sets standards for publicly traded American companies, governs the rules pertaining to this 
process, and has not announced an investigation of ExxonMobil to date. Id. 
 20 Smith, supra note 19. 
 21 See infra notes 26–81 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 26–82 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 82–113 and accompanying text. ExxonMobil has resisted this comparison, 
calling tobacco a harmful, addictive product used by a “portion of the public,” whereas fossil fuels 
are a key part of the global economy. Amy Hardler et al., Exxon Fires Back at Climate Change 
Probe, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2016, 3:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-fires-back-at-
climate-change-probe-1460574535 [https://perma.cc/5WAV-KCW5]. 
 24 See infra notes 114–160 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 161–214 and accompanying text. 
 26 Tidman, supra note 4, at 389; see N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–359-H (McKinney 2016). 
 27 Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFF. May–Jun. 2004, at 51, https://
www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/feature_thompson_mayjun04.msp [https://perma.cc/
A67T-5892]; see N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–359-H. 
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by peddling worthless pieces of paper that represented valueless or nonex-
istent corporations.28 
The New York Attorney General’s Investor Protection Bureau enforces 
the Act.29 The Act enables the Attorney General to investigate and bring 
enforcement action to stop securities fraud if the Attorney General believes 
that someone previously engaged in, is currently engaged in, or is about to 
engage in fraudulent practices.30 
The Martin Act uniquely enables the New York Attorney General to 
seek both civil and criminal penalties.31 When originally enacted, the statute 
only granted the Attorney General authority to seek civil penalties; the New 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Thompson, supra note 27. These peddlers were purportedly willing to “sell shares of the 
blue sky if they could.” Id. Unlike other states’ blue sky laws, the Martin Act focuses on enforce-
ment against fraud, and does not regulate the registration of brokers and securities. Id. 
 29 Investor Protection Bureau, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.ag.ny.
gov/bureau/investor-protection-bureau [https://perma.cc/VY2T-PPDR]; Jeff Izant, Mens Rea and 
the Martin Act: A Weapon of Choice for Securities Fraud Prosecutions?, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 913, 939; see N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–359-H. This authority is part of the Attorney 
General’s role as the “People’s Lawyer” and state’s chief legal officer. Our Office, N.Y. STATE 
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://ag.ny.gov/our-office [https://perma.cc/2WRV-2848]. 
 30 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 353. The New York Attorney General pursues Martin Act investi-
gations to protect consumers and investors. Id. Some ExxonMobil investors have taken matters 
into their own hands regarding the company’s actions related to climate change. See Terry Wade 
& Anna Driver, Rockefeller Family Fund Hits Exxon, Divests from Fossil Fuels, REUTERS (Mar. 
24, 2016, 10:48 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-rockefeller-exxon-mobil-investments-
idUSKCN0WP266 [http://perma.cc/3KZC-9QUV]. In March 2016, the Rockefeller Family Fund 
announced it was divesting from fossil fuels, including its ExxonMobil holdings. Id. While only a 
small portion of the Rockefeller Family Fund’s endowment is invested in fossil fuels, the move is 
significant because the Rockefeller family made its fortune from Standard Oil, a corporate prede-
cessor to ExxonMobil. Id. A separate group of ExxonMobil investors have pushed the company to 
increase its transparency around climate change, leading to the appointment of climate scientist 
Susan Avery to the ExxonMobil board of directors. Ed Crooks, ExxonMobil Appoints Climate 
Scientist to Board, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d87ce444-e388-
11e6-8405-9e5580d6e5fb [https://perma.cc/ZFM3-73ZY]. Another group of shareholders filed a 
class action lawsuit against ExxonMobil for allegedly concealing knowledge about climate change 
related to the valuation of its hydrocarbon reserves. Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securi-
ties Law at *22–23, Ramirez v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 16-cv-03111 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2016), 
2016 WL 6594861. The shareholders contend that ExxonMobil overstated its ability to extract the 
reserves despite its knowledge that carbon limits would prevent it from doing so. Id. at *1–2. The 
lawsuit claims that ExxonMobil did so in order to secure a twelve billion dollar debt offering in 
the spring of 2016. Id. at *2. Months later, the company’s share price fell when it became apparent 
that the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Schneiderman were investigating the 
company’s accounting methods. Id. at *3; see supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. The 
shareholders seek compensatory damages for their losses caused by the thirteen percent drop in 
share price after the investigations were announced. Complaint for Violation of Federal Securities 
Law, supra, at *24. At the time of publication, this case was ongoing. Id. 
 31 Kulbir Walha & Edward E. Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against Corporate Malfea-
sance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study of Eliot Spitzer and Marsh & 
McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111, 1116 (2005). 
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York legislature strengthened the statute in 1955 by amending it to include 
criminal penalties.32 
The Attorney General, pursuant to the Martin Act, has significant pow-
er to investigate suspected fraud related to the offer, sale, and purchase of 
securities.33 The New York Court of Appeals defined fraud under the statute 
as any deceitful or dishonest practice.34 The court reasoned that because the 
purpose of the Act is to prevent any fraud in the sale of securities, the Act 
governs any actions that tend to deceive or mislead investors, without re-
gard to the actor’s intent.35  
 Under the Act, the Attorney General may sue to permanently enjoin 
fraudulent securities practices if he or she believes that any person or corpo-
ration is involved in fraudulent activities.36 The Act is an especially potent 
tool in prosecuting fraud because the Attorney General does not need to 
show that the corporate defendant had any intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud in order for the Attorney General to investigate, subpoena, or enjoin 
a party.37 New York courts have upheld the statute’s lack of intent.38 For 
example, in People v. Photocolor Corp., the court found that restricting the 
Attorney General’s enforcement power to intentional acts of fraud would 
contradict the legislature’s intent to grant the Attorney General the power to 
protect “against fraudulent practice in the advertisement and sale of securi-
ties.”39 
The statute also does not require the Attorney General to show that 
third parties or the public relied on the defendant’s fraudulent actions, nor is 
there a requirement of damages suffered.40 Additionally, those called in for 
questioning as part of Martin Act investigations do not have a right to coun-
sel, nor a right against self-incrimination.41 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. 
 33 Investor Protection Bureau, supra note 29; Thompson, supra note 27, at 50. 
 34 People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926). 
 35 Id. 
 36 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2016). 
 37 People v. Barysh, 408 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Tidman, supra note 4, at 390. 
 38 Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. at 658 (establishing that the Martin Act’s purpose is to 
prevent all kinds of fraud and the statute does not require the fraudulent act to have any evil de-
sign); Barysh, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (stating plainly that the Martin Act does not require the com-
mon law element of scienter); People v. Photocolor Corp., 281 N.Y.S. 130, 135, 137 (Sup. Ct. 
1935) (citing Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. at 657–58) (holding that the Martin Act reaches a 
variety of conduct and does not require malfeasance or even outright fraud). 
 39 281 N.Y.S. at 136–37. 
 40 Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, Securities, Investigations and Prosecutions Under 
the Martin Act, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 31, 2003), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=900005383709/
?slreturn=20160928114851 [https://perma.cc/QG3E-AUVQ]. 
 41 Thompson, supra note 27, at 51. 
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B. A History of Enforcement from Ottinger to Schneiderman 
The Act was not always as strong as it is today.42 Originally, the Act 
automatically granted immunity to anyone who testified in cooperation with 
an investigation, making it difficult to prosecute corporate actors the Attor-
ney General believed were engaging in fraud.43 After the removal of the 
Act’s immunity clause in 1925, Attorney General Albert Ottinger became 
the first to aggressively use the Act.44 
Ottinger’s actions survived a challenge that sought to limit the statute’s 
subpoena power as unconstitutional.45 In Dunham v. Ottinger, a stockbroker 
objected to an investigation by Ottinger on the grounds that the Act grants 
the Attorney General judicial powers, subjects a defendant to unlawful 
search and seizure, and compels a defendant to incriminate himself.46 The 
plaintiff argued that the Attorney General determines the issue of a civil 
violation or of criminal guilt in a judicial manner, has power to conduct an 
investigation so broad that it amounts to search and seizure, and compels 
self-incrimination because the statute’s immunity clause was removed.47 
The Court of Appeals of New York held that the Attorney General does not 
act judicially in determining if unlawful practices should be enjoined, the 
statute does not authorize unreasonable search and seizure, and that the 
power to subpoena and examine witnesses is necessary to ensure proper 
supervision of a corporations’ affairs.48 
After Ottinger, later Attorneys General overlooked the statute until Eliot 
Spitzer used it as a tool for investigating and prosecuting large financial 
firms.49 The additional threat of criminal penalties in the Act allowed Spitzer 
to obtain multi-million dollar settlements from national financial giants de-
spite the two thousand dollar statutory limit on fines.50 
Spitzer opened a Martin Act investigation into Merrill Lynch after De-
bases Kanjilal, a pediatrician, brought an arbitration action in early 2001 
against Merill Lynch stock analyst Henry Blodget.51 Kanjilal claimed he 
lost over five hundred thousand dollars by investing in companies recom-
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. at 50. 
 43 Id. at 51. 
 44 Id. Ottinger used the Martin Act to close the Consolidated Stock Exchange. Id. 
 45 Dunham v. Ottinger, 154 N.E. 298, 299–300, 302 (N.Y. 1926). 
 46 Id. at 298–300. 
 47 See id. at 299–300. 
 48 Id. at 300. 
 49 See Thompson, supra note 27, at 52. 
 50 See Walha & Filusch, supra note 31, at 1116; see infra notes 68, 73 and accompanying 
text. 
 51 Thompson, supra note 27, at 53; Barbara Moses, The “Discovery” of Analyst Conflicts on 
Wall Street, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 89, 99 (2004). 
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mended by Blodget.52 Kanjilal said that Blodget advised him to refrain from 
selling his stock in the internet company InfoSpace as its price declined be-
cause of an undisclosed connection between Merrill Lynch’s investment 
banking business and InfoSpace.53 Under Merill Lynch’s compensation 
scheme, this conflict of interest benefited Blodget.54 In July 2001, Merrill 
Lynch settled with Kanjilal for four hundred thousand dollars in order to 
avoid the cost of litigation.55 
Spitzer intensified discovery efforts when Merrill Lynch settled with 
Kanjilal on favorable terms to its former client, suggesting to Spitzer that the 
company was hiding something.56 After a year of investigation, in April 2002, 
his office contacted Kanjilal’s lawyer, who shared his insight to further the 
Attorney General’s investigation.57 
During the summer of 2001, Spitzer’s office conducted numerous in-
terviews with Blodget.58 If a defendant in a Martin Act investigation refuses 
to be examined, answer material questions, or produce documents relevant 
to the inquiry when ordered to by the judge conducting the inquiry, the re-
fusal will be prima facie evidence of the defendant’s fraud.59 After the de-
fendant’s refusal, the New York court overseeing the investigation may is-
sue a permanent injunction without further showing of fault by the Attorney 
General.60 Nevertheless, Blodget, who was well known as a star analyst for 
his accurate recommendations regarding internet stocks, seemed mostly 
unfazed by the investigation and corresponding interviews.61 
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 53 Charles Gasparino, All-Star Analyst Faces Arbitration After Internet Picks Hit the Skids, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2001, 12:19 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB98349748239270607 
[https://perma.cc/GJR7-YW6G]. 
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 55 Charles Gasparino, Merrill Settles with Former Client in Wake of Analyst’s Stock Call, WALL 
ST. J. (July 20, 2001, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB99558452775686457 [https://
perma.cc/PYW8-G8DP]. 
 56 Thompson, supra note 27, at 53. 
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com/magazine/2003/04/07/the-investigation [https://perma.cc/8RRM-2P5U]. 
124 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 44:115 
 Attorney General Spitzer commenced a Martin Act proceeding against 
Merrill Lynch, Blodget, and seven other employees.62 Subpoenas from the 
investigation uncovered emails showing that brokers gave investment advice 
to clients based on promises of future investment banking business with Mer-
rill Lynch.63 The investigation resulted in a court order that required Merrill 
Lynch to disclose any prior, current, or potential investment banking relation-
ships with the companies for which it was issuing investment advice.64 
By taking the proceeding public through press conferences and public 
statements, Spitzer demonstrated another strength of the Act.65 In the week 
after he publicized the complaint against Merrill Lynch, the company’s 
stock price plummeted, resulting in a five billion dollar decrease in market 
value.66 At the end of six weeks, Merrill Lynch settled with Spitzer’s office, 
agreeing to pay a one hundred million dollar civil penalty.67 The company 
agreed to disclose its investment banking relationships.68 As part of the set-
tlement, Merrill Lynch also created an internal Research Recommendation 
Committee to monitor its analysts, and to remove any connection between 
the investment banking group’s performance and analysts’ compensation.69 
After settling with Merrill Lynch, Spitzer joined with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the National Association of Securities 
Dealers, the New York Stock Exchange, and the North American Securities 
Administrators Association to investigate investment banking practices in 
New York’s ten largest investment firms, including Merrill Lynch.70 Ulti-
mately, Credit Suisse, First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Sa-
lomon Smith Barney, Bear Sterns, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Chase, Leh-
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 63 Thompson, supra note 27, at 53; Moses, supra note 51, at 100. 
 64 Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354 at 4, In re Spitzer, No. 02-401522 
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 65 See Thompson, supra note 27, at 53. 
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Insider (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.axelspringer.de/en/presse/Leading-Digital-Publisher-Axel-
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mains the site’s CEO and Editor in Chief. Id. 
 70 Moses, supra note 51, at 102. 
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man Brothers, and UBS all agreed to the disclosure requirements imposed 
on Merrill Lynch as a result of the Martin Act proceeding.71 The firms also 
agreed to pay over 1.4 billion dollars in penalties, restitution, and funds for 
investor education, well above the two thousand dollar limit that the New 
York Attorney General could seek in a civil case.72 
Spitzer went on to attack the hedge fund and mutual fund industries us-
ing the Act.73 He obtained a forty million dollar settlement with the hedge 
fund Canary Capital Partners for its illegal trades with mutual funds.74 His 
successor, Andrew Cuomo, used the Act similarly to investigate Ernst & 
Young for approving an accounting technique at Lehman Brothers that ena-
bled fraud.75 
Cuomo’s successor Schneiderman used the Act in both financial and en-
vironmental matters.76 Since taking the office of Attorney General in 2011, 
Schneiderman has reached settlements with Bank of New York Mellon, 
JPMorgan Chase, and BlackRock for violations of the Martin Act.77 Schnei-
derman also investigated natural gas companies regarding public disclosures 
of information related to the financial risks of fracking.78 As part of an 
agreement reached in October 2014, Anadarko Petroleum Corp. and EOG 
Resources committed to disclose financial risks posed by the environmental 
impacts of fracking.79 At the time, Schneiderman said his office was still 
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 78 Fracking Disclosure Press Release, supra note 76. 
 79 Id. 
126 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 44:115 
looking into other companies’ disclosure practices.80 A month later, the Attor-
ney General began his investigation of ExxonMobil.81 
II. AN INTERSTATE EFFORT TO TAKE ON BIG TOBACCO: REACHING THE 
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
States’ Attorneys General have worked together to jointly prosecute 
cross-border violations of federal and state laws when the underlying statutes 
and bad acts are sufficiently similar.82 States’ Attorneys General may share 
information with each other pursuant to confidentiality agreements.83 A prime 
example of this type of inter-state cooperation is the so-called “Master Set-
tlement Agreement” (“the Agreement”) reached between Attorneys General 
from forty-six states and the four largest tobacco companies—Philip Morris 
Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown and Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., and Lorillard Tobacco Company—for 206 billion dollars.84 
Anti-tobacco activists classify tobacco litigation in waves, beginning 
in the 1950s and continuing today.85 In the first and second waves of litiga-
tion, private plaintiffs brought cases against tobacco companies seeking to 
recover for medical expenses related to smoking.86 In the 1950s through the 
1980s, tobacco companies successfully dismissed or settled these private 
cases by denying that smoking caused lung cancer, and claiming that such a 
connection was dubious given available research.87 In the next wave of liti-
gation from the 1980s through the early 1990s, the companies maintained a 
nearly spotless record in defending themselves against private individuals 
by using mounting legal costs and delay tactics to push these individuals out 
of court.88 In 1995, President William Clinton approved legislation declar-
ing nicotine an addictive drug, and authorized the Food and Drug Admin-
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istration (FDA) to regulate tobacco products.89 Clinton also announced reg-
ulations that would restrict the sale and distribution of tobacco products.90 
Attorneys General from Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota 
first filed lawsuits against Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown and Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., and Lorillard Tobacco Company.91 Mississippi’s 
Attorney General Mike Moore said the lawsuit simply placed the cost of the 
health crisis on the companies that caused it.92 The Attorneys Generals’ 
claims varied from case to case and included unjust enrichment, public nui-
sance, negligence, antitrust conspiracy, consumer fraud, and racketeering.93 
The theory underlying these claims was the belief that the tobacco compa-
nies should repay the state Medicaid funds spent on treating smoking-
related illnesses.94 Each state eventually signed individual settlements with 
the tobacco companies.95 
Over the next few years, more states’ Attorneys General filed lawsuits 
against the same four tobacco companies in order to seek compensation for 
the costs of treating cigarette-related disease and illness.96 Under this legal 
theory, the tobacco companies could not use the defense that smoking is a 
personal choice and smokers therefore subjected themselves to harm.97 The 
states alleged a number of claims including conspiracy, product liability, 
racketeering, fraud, and violations of antitrust, unfair trade, and public nui-
sance laws.98 Specifically, the lawsuits alleged the tobacco companies had 
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misled and deceived consumers by restricting access to their scientific re-
search regarding the risks of cigarettes; committed fraud and racketeering 
by publicizing false statements about nicotine’s addictiveness and smok-
ing’s health effects; and violated antitrust laws by stifling the development 
of safer cigarettes.99 
As even more states’ Attorneys General filed lawsuits over the next three 
years, the tobacco manufacturers negotiated towards a Tobacco Resolution, a 
bill which was contingent on congressional approval.100 The Tobacco Resolu-
tion failed when it appeared that it would subject the companies to higher 
fines and more regulations than they were willing to accept.101 
In November 1998, forty-five states’ Attorneys General along with At-
torneys General from the District of Columbia and six territories adopted a 
different strategy to end litigation, signing the Master Settlement Agree-
ment.102 The Agreement granted participating states and territories the pow-
er to enforce the agreement, bypassing the need for Congressional approv-
al.103 In addition to obligating the four tobacco companies to pay 206 billion 
dollars in compensation to the states for health expenditures related to 
smoking, the Agreement also created restrictions on advertising to limit the 
attractiveness of cigarettes, especially to children.104 In exchange, the par-
ticipating states and territories released the companies from all past claims 
related to tobacco sale, use, and marketing, and from any future monetary 
claims in connection to exposure to tobacco products or reimbursement for 
healthcare costs.105 
Because of the significant financial burden to the participating tobacco 
companies under the Agreement, it included a provision that would de-
crease the four tobacco companies’ payments if they lost market share in 
that year.106 The Agreement also required participating states and territories 
to each adopt statutes that effectively neutralized the competitive disad-
vantages of complying with the Agreement for the participating tobacco 
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companies.107 If a state or territory failed to adopt this legislation, it could 
lose future payments pursuant to the Agreement.108 The novel structure of 
the Agreement, therefore, allowed a majority of states to use state legisla-
tion to create national regulation of the tobacco industry.109  
The Agreement steered by multiple Attorneys General serves as a use-
ful potential blueprint for future litigation against oil and gas companies if 
they similarly misled investors about the effects of their activities on cli-
mate change.110 In addition to other reforms mandated by the Agreement, it 
required the participating tobacco companies to disclose thirty-five million 
pages of their research and marketing documents, which opened the door to 
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a lawsuit from Congress and the FDA.111 The documents revealed that the 
companies deceived the public through marketing campaigns, intentionally 
made their products addictive, and concealed the effect tobacco has on 
health.112 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit found the defendant tobacco companies guilty of racketeering, or 
illegally collaborating, in order to defraud the American public about the 
harms of tobacco.113 
III. THE MARTIN ACT AND EXXONMOBIL 
A. Early Energy Investigations: Xcel and Peabody Spark Attorneys 
Generals’ Interest 
On December 12, 2015, the global community agreed to take steps to 
mitigate climate change with the adoption of the Paris Agreement; however, 
domestic litigation to hold corporations liable for past contributions to cli-
mate change have been largely unsuccessful.114 New York Attorney General 
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Eric Schneiderman’s Martin Act investigation into ExxonMobil has the po-
tential to spur the kind of broad national reform that the Agreement created 
for the tobacco industry.115 The strengths of the Martin Act (“the Act”) 
make New York the ideal venue for the first state action against ExxonMo-
bil.116 The statute’s strengths, especially its ability to force the disclosure of 
corporate information, may lead the way for subsequent federal actions.117  
The broad subpoena powers of the Act allow the Attorney General to 
gain a great deal of otherwise confidential information.118 In 2007, Attorney 
General Andrew Cuomo used the statute to subpoena five energy companies 
that either have or planned to have coal-fired power plants.119 In August 
2008, Cuomo reached an agreement with Xcel Energy, requiring the com-
pany to disclose the financial risks that climate change can pose.120 This 
was the first enforceable agreement at the state or federal level that required 
a public company to disclose the risks of climate change in filings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).121 In the press release an-
nouncing the agreement with Xcel Energy, Cuomo said that distorting facts 
about climate change is misleading and must be stopped.122 Months later, in 
October 2008, Cuomo followed through with his pledge to continue 
fighting for transparency regarding climate change by reaching a similar 
agreement with the national energy company Dynegy Inc.123 Energy com-
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pany AES Corp. also entered a similar agreement with Cuomo’s office in 
November 2009.124 
Since his first election to the office of Attorney General in 2010, 
Schniederman has followed in Cuomo’s footsteps.125 He used the Act to in-
vestigate Peabody Energy Corp., the world’s largest publicly traded coal 
company, which resulted in a settlement in November 2015.126 The two-year 
investigation found that Peabody violated the Act’s prohibition of false and 
misleading statements in securities transactions.127 Specifically, Schneider-
man found that Peabody Energy Corp. violated the Act because it publicly 
stated that the company could not predict the impact of climate change laws 
or regulations on its performance, even though an internal projection con-
tained specific predictions for regulatory actions.128 Although the Peabody 
Energy Corp. settlement is unrelated to the ExxonMobil investigation, it 
demonstrates Schneiderman’s broader goal of seeking greater disclosure and 
transparency from other energy companies.129 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces 
Agreement with Aes to Disclose Climate Change Risks to Investors (Nov. 19, 2009), http://
www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-announces-agreement-aes-disclose-climate-
change-risks-investors [https://perma.cc/BX5B-PHUZ]. 
 125 About Eric, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN FOR ATT’Y GEN., https://ericschneiderman.com/about-
eric/ [https://perma.cc/2M27-YU3C]. 
 126 See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Secures Unprec-
edented Agreement with Peabody Energy to End Misleading Statements and Disclose Risks Arising 
from Climate Change (Nov. 9, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-
unprecedented-agreement-peabody-energy-end-misleading [https://perma.cc/PS4R-ATP5] [hereinaf-
ter Peabody Energy Press Release]. In April 2016, Peabody Energy Corp. filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy protection, citing a challenging market. John W. Miller & Matt Jarzemsky, Peabody Energy 
Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14 2016, 6:37 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/peabody-energy-files-for-chapter-11-protection-from-creditors-1460533760 [https://
perma.cc/AS6M-V6TF]. The company emerged from bankruptcy protection in August 2016 and will 
continue to operate in a reorganized manner. Press Release, Peabody Energy, Peabody Energy Busi-
ness Plan Approved by Debtor-In-Possession Lenders; Business Plan to Form Foundation for Plan of 
Reorganization (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/peabody-energy-
business-plan-approved-by-debtor-in-possession-lenders-business-plan-to-form-foundation-for-plan-
of-reorganization-300311714.html [https://perma.cc/K5L9-P822]. 
 127 See Peabody Energy Press Release, supra note 126. 
 128 Id.  
 129 David Hasemyer, Peabody Settlement Shows Muscle of Law Now Aimed at Exxon, IN-
SIDECLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/10112015/peabody-coal-
climate-change-settlement-new-york-ag-exxon-subpoena-investigation [https://perma.cc/S3NL-
6QC3]. A former federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota 
commented on the similarity of the Peabody and ExxonMobil investigations saying, “[t]he central 
question in both cases is what were Exxon and Peabody saying publically [sic] compared to what 
they knew internally.” Id. 
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B. Refining a Theory of Fraud 
In the mid-1980s, legislators in the United States began to call for ac-
tion that would address the trend of climate change.130 Fearing the impact of 
restrictive legislation or regulation on its business, Exxon and other energy 
companies including Mobil Oil and Shell Oil formed the Global Climate 
Coalition.131 This lobbying group made public statements that cast doubt on 
the scientific certainty of climate change and warned of the negative impact 
climate change regulation would have on the American economy.132 
The Global Climate Coalition spent money in the years preceding the 
Kyoto Protocol to lobby and advance public relations campaigns suggesting 
that higher levels of carbon dioxide could benefit crop production, which 
might in turn help combat world hunger.133 ExxonMobil continued to lobby 
against fossil fuel legislation and regulation during the Bush-Cheney ad-
ministration spanning 2001 through 2009 by forcefully undermining main-
stream science regarding climate change.134 
If ExxonMobil made these business decisions based on the negative 
ramifications of climate change, while outwardly stating that the science 
surrounding climate change was too uncertain to act on, this contradiction 
could amount to a violation of the Martin Act.135 ExxonMobil again public-
ly cast doubt conclusions drawn by the company’s researchers regarding 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Id.; Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. TIMES (June 
24, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-expert-tells-senate.
html [https://perma.cc/GK2A-CZUQ]. 
 131 See Amy Lieberman & Susanne Rust, Big Oil Braced for Global Warming While It Fought 
Regulations, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), http://graphics.latimes.com/oil-operations/ [https://perma.
cc/UA27-3QJ7]. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. The United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, an international treaty committing 
to mandatory greenhouse gas emissions targets. See id. In 1997, Exxon’s chairman and CEO, Lee 
Raymond, said “it is highly unlikely that the temperature in the middle of the next century will be 
significantly affected whether policies are enacted now or 20 years from now.” Neela Banerjee et 
al., Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming Decades Ago, IN-
SIDECLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/15092015/Exxons-own-
research-confirmed-fossil-fuels-role-in-global-warming [https://perma.cc/HJZ9-4Y6Q]. 
 134 David Hasemyer & John H. Cushman Jr., Exxon Sowed Doubt About Climate Science for 
Decades by Stressing Uncertainty, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Oct. 22, 2015), http://insideclimate
news.org/news/22102015/Exxon-Sowed-Doubt-about-Climate-Science-for-Decades-by-Stressing-
Uncertainty [https://perma.cc/L3G4-B7HR]. If Exxon incorporated climate change concerns into 
its business decisions while executives publicly stated the company could not rely on uncertain 
climate change science to inform its business decisions, this discrepancy could amount to fraud 
under the Act. See People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 657 (N.Y. 1926) (adopting a 
broad definition of fraud under the Martin Act). 
 135 See Banerjee et al., supra note 133. Schneiderman’s investigation and theory of the case 
remain private, but it is widely believed that an alleged discrepancy between ExxonMobil’s inter-
nal conduct and external statements regarding climate change is the basis for the Martin Act ac-
tion. Gillis & Krauss, supra note 1. 
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climate change in 1989, despite the fact that the company already incorpo-
rated climate change considerations into its business decisions.136 For ex-
ample, InsideClimate News interviews with former ExxonMobil executives 
and federal officials, and examinations of historical archives show that 
Exxon’s climate research program between 1977 and 1986 demonstrated 
that the company took the potential threat of climate change very serious-
ly.137 Company executives adopted a long-term corporate strategy based on 
their scientists’ predictions that the realities of climate change would even-
tually force a global transition away from fossil fuels.138 
In addition to creating momentum for investigations and actions from 
other states’ Attorneys General and private plaintiffs, Schneiderman’s inves-
tigation into ExxonMobil may generate more widespread litigation around 
climate change through actions against other large energy companies.139 
The Los Angeles Times’ investigation into ExxonMobil also uncovered 
similar discrepancies between company policy and internal findings at Mo-
bil Oil and Shell Oil.140 The Los Angeles Times story highlights that while 
these Global Climate Coalition companies fought climate change regula-
tions in the 1990s, they designed and constructed protections to insulate 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Lisa Song et al., Exxon Confirmed Global Warming Consensus in 1982 with In-House 
Climate Models, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Sep. 22, 2015), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/1809
2015/exxon-confirmed-global-warming-consensus-in-1982-with-in-house-climate-models [https://
perma.cc/FK7R-6QUA]; see Neela Banerjee & Lisa Song, Exxon’s Business Ambition Collided 
with Climate Change Under a Distant Sea, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Oct. 8, 2015), http://
insideclimatenews.org/news/08102015/Exxons-Business-Ambition-Collided-with-Climate-Change-
Under-a-Distant-Sea [http://perma.cc/8U79-ANU5]. 
 137 Banerjee & Song, supra note 136. 
 138 Id. Exxon’s scientists looked specifically to how quickly oceans could absorb atmospheric 
carbon dioxide and used this measurement to speculate the amount of time before a transition 
away from fossil fuels was forced. Id. 
 139 See Lieberman & Rust, supra note 131 (outlining similarly deceptive practices at Exxon’s 
peer companies Shell Oil, Conoco, and Total). In February 2017, The Guardian uncovered a film 
produced by Shell Oil in 1991 titled “Climate of Concern,” that warned of the risks of climate 
change. Damian Carrington & Jelmer Mommers, “Shell Knew”: Oil Giant’s 1991 Film Warned of 
Climate Change Danger, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2017, 5:20 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2017/feb/28/shell-knew-oil-giants-1991-film-warned-climate-change-danger [https://
perma.cc/V8MM-98JW]. Chevron disclosed in its 2016 year-end financial report filed with the SEC 
that increased public concern regarding climate change could bring pressure to the company in the 
form or regulation or litigation. Keith Goldberg, Chevron Admits Risks of Climate Change Probes, 
Litigation, LAW360, https://www.law360.com/articles/895590/chevron-admits-risks-of-climate-
change-probes-litigation [https://perma.cc/397W-6CPL]. Neither company has become the subject 
of litigation or an investigation to date. See Carrington & Mommers, supra; see also Goldberg, 
supra. 
 140 Lieberman & Rust, supra note 131 (detailing how Mobil Oil and Shell Oil fought regula-
tions addressing climate change which would harm their business, while simultaneously develop-
ing methods to protect their infrastructure from climate change’s predicted effects). Mobil Oil 
later merged with Exxon to form ExxonMobil. Exxon: The Road Not Taken, supra note 10. 
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infrastructure from the rising sea levels and more turbulent storms associat-
ed with climate change.141 
C. Schneiderman and the SEC’s Overlapping Jurisdiction Over Investor 
Protection, Asset Write-Downs, and Booking Reserves 
Schneiderman’s powers under the Martin Act coexist with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission’s powers under the Securities Act of 1933 
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.142 The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) is the federal agency responsible for protecting inves-
tors by enforcing the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, which require publicly traded companies to disclose material facts, 
including the costs and effects of complying with environmental laws.143 
Though the SEC bristled at Spitzer’s Merrill Lynch investigation, viewing 
the Martin Act and Spitzer’s actions as an intrusion into federal securities 
regulation, the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
do not expressly preempt the Martin Act.144 The issue of potential preemp-
tion—whereby federal law supersedes a state law—appeared in the form of 
the proposed Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 
2003, which would have added to the SEC’s powers and precluded states 
from reaching separate settlements that differed from or added to require-
ments set by the SEC.145 Congress never enacted this bill.146 
The expansion of Schneiderman’s investigation into ExxonMobil’s ac-
counting practices in September 2016 also stems from his power under the 
Martin Act, and involves overlapping jurisdiction with the SEC.147 In 2015, 
then-CEO Rex Tillerson said the company avoided write-downs because of 
the pressure placed on executives to keep operating costs low.148 He ex-
                                                                                                                           
 141 Lieberman & Rust, supra note 131. A spokesperson for ExxonMobil explained, “there is 
nothing inconsistent about ExxonMobil managing potential environmental risks while speaking 
publicly about the limits of scientific knowledge and advocating for effective public policy ap-
proaches.” Id. 
 142 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–78a (2012); The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml [https://perma.cc/XV2C-YWHS]; Capozza, supra 
note 119, at 32.  
 143 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–78a; What We Do, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/25HK-3J3G]. 
 144 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–78a; Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal 
Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin 
Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 958 (2005). 
 145 Macey, supra note 144, at 957. 
 146 Id. at 957–58. 
 147 See Olson, supra note 13 (describing Schneiderman’s intent to uncover why ExxonMobil 
had historically not written down the value of its oil and gas reserves). 
 148 Id. In February 2017, the Senate confirmed President Donald Trump’s selection of Rex Till-
erson as Secretary of State. Gardiner Harris, Rex Tillerson Is Confirmed as Secretary of State, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/us/politics/rex-tillerson-secretary-of-
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plained the longstanding practice of not writing down assets because in the 
company’s view, temporary fluctuations do not make ExxonMobil’s exist-
ing oil and gas reserves permanently less valuable or prohibitively expen-
sive to drill.149 The company’s prediction for energy trends closely relates to 
how it accounts for the price of its existing oil and gas wells, and also re-
flects how it views climate change and potential future regulation.150 These 
valuations are important because they affect the current and forecasted val-
ue of the company overall.151  
Despite pushback from ExxonMobil,152 Schneiderman continued his 
investigation: on October 14, 2016, he moved to compel production from 
ExxonMobil’s auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (“PwC”) after the 
company refused to respond to Schneiderman’s August 2016 subpoena, 
claiming attorney-client privilege under Texas law.153 Judge Barry R. Os-
trager found that Texas’ attorney-client statute did not preclude PwC from 
complying with the subpoena, and also that New York law—not Texas 
law—governs the subpoena and investigation.154 
                                                                                                                           
state-confirmed.html [https://perma.cc/24UR-25W9]. President Trump has not spoken specifically to 
the potential ExxonMobil investigations, but has called climate change a hoax. But see Holly Ellyatt, 
Think Trump Dismisses Climate Change? Think Again, CNBC (May 27, 2016, 4:06 AM), http://
www.cnbc.com/2016/05/27/think-trump-dismisses-climate-change-think-again.html [https://perma.
cc/774Z-RGD4. Contrary to his public statements, in May 2016 he took action to build a sea wall to 
protect one of his golf courses in Ireland. Id. The sea wall is a necessary precaution to protect the golf 
course from rising sea levels associated with global warming. Id. 
 149 Olson, supra note 13. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Michael Rapoport et al., When Should a Company Write Down Assets, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
16, 2016, 6:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/when-should-a-company-write-down-assets-147
4064470 [https://perma.cc/5JMK-EYXL]. Companies have some discretion in valuation, but Exx-
onMobil was alone among energy companies in failing to write-down its assets. Id. 
 152 See supra notes 184–193 and accompanying text (describing ExxonMobil’s lawsuits filed 
against Healey and Schneiderman). 
 153 People v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 451962/16, 2016 WL 6330156, at *3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2016). 
 154 Id., at *1. In March 2017, Schneiderman learned that former chief executive Rex Tillerson 
had used an email alias—wayne.tracker@exxonmobil.com—in some conversations around cli-
mate change. Ailworth, supra note 14. Schneiderman’s office argued to Judge Ostrager that con-
cealing the existence and use of this email address was misleading, and indicated ExxonMobil’s 
unwillingness to fully cooperate with proper search, collection, and production procedures related 
to the investigation. Letter from John Oleske, Senior Enforcement Counsel, N.Y. State Office of 
the Att’y Gen., to J. Barry R. Ostrager, Supreme Court, New York County (Mar. 13, 2017), https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/3516559-TILLERSON-NY-AG-LETTER.html [https://perma.
cc/9QSG-JN9R]. ExxonMobil responded that Tillerson’s use of the email alias was proper and 
necessary to enable the executive to receive important, time-sensitive messages separately from 
his main email address. Ailworth, supra note 14. Wayne is Tillerson’s middle name; Tracker may 
refer to his past role as president of the Boy Scouts of America. Ernest Scheyder, Tillerson’s 
Email Alias Was Prompted by Business Needs, Exxon Says, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2017, 6:16 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tillerson-email-idUSKBN16L2QD [https://perma.cc/Q8CY-
ST8R]. 
2017] New York’s Martin Act as a Tool to Combat Climate Change 137 
A few days after Schneiderman’s office expanded its investigation into 
ExxonMobil’s accounting practices, the SEC announced it too had begun 
investigating ExxonMobil and its auditor, PwC.155 The SEC’s investigation 
focuses on ExxonMobil’s calculation of how the escalating global response 
to climate change may impact its business by looking into the company’s 
practice of not writing down the values of its oil and gas reserves.156 Presi-
dent Trump’s choice for the new chairman of the SEC, Jay Clayton, has 
previously encouraged his clients to provide more climate change disclo-
sures as a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell.157 
In early 2017, in an apparent response to mounting pressure from 
Schneiderman and the SEC, ExxonMobil wrote down the value of more 
than two billion dollars in its natural gas assets in the Rocky Mountains.158 
ExxonMobil also took the value of 3.5 billion barrels of its Canadian oil 
reserves off of its book, a signal that it would not be profitable to extract.159 
Neither Schneiderman nor the SEC have commented on ExxonMobil’s ac-
tions or any effect these actions might have on the respective investiga-
tions.160 
                                                                                                                           
 155 Olson & Viswanatha, supra note 16. 
 156 Id. The House Science, Space, and Technology Committee sent a letter to the SEC ex-
pressing its concern that the investigative action may discourage the scientific research underlying 
the asset valuations. Press Release, Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., Committee Probes SEC’s 
Investigation of Exxon (Sept. 29, 2016), https://science.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-
probes-sec-s-investigation-exxon [https://perma.cc/Q6QQ-6H5C]. At the time of publication, the 
case was ongoing. See id. 
 157 Francine McKenna, Trump’s SEC Pick Pushed Clients to Say More About Climate-
Change Risks, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 5, 2017, 1:35 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
trumps-sec-pick-pushed-clients-to-say-more-about-climate-change-risks-2017-01-05 [https://perma.
cc/3YV5-NPZG]. Clayton himself has not publicly weighed in on the SEC’s ExxonMobil investi-
gation. Id. Clayton’s confirmation hearings were ongoing through March 2017. Matt Egan, 
Trump’s Wall Street Cop Is a Big Defender of Wall Street, CNN: MONEY (Mar. 22, 2017, 10:53 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/22/investing/jay-clayton-sec-hearing-wall-street-defender/ 
[http://perma.cc/PVL7-GG4K]. 
 158 Olson, supra note 13. Since ExxonMobil purchased the natural gas reserves from XTO 
Energy in 2010, the price of natural gas has fallen significantly due to a drilling boom. Id. 
 159 Smith, supra note 19. The Canadian oil reserves are a less attractive source of energy now 
than they were when ExxonMobil initially invested in them due to a combination of the growth of 
newer sources of crude oil that is cheaper to extract, and Canadian regulations that make its oil 
more expensive to extract and refine. Sarah Kent et al., Energy Companies Face Crude Reality: 
Better to Leave It in the Ground, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/energy-companies-face-crude-reality-better-to-leave-it-in-the-ground-1487327406 [https://
perma.cc/C5VX-B29N]. 
 160 See Smith, supra note 19. 
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IV. THE STATES TAKE SIDES 
A. The Green 20 Comes Together 
Schneiderman’s investigation has created momentum for additional 
state-level litigation.161 On January 20, 2016, the Los Angeles Times report-
ed that California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris was investigating 
ExxonMobil’s climate change statements made to the public.162 Harris’ in-
vestigation presumably focused on whether ExxonMobil’s internal research 
regarding the impact of climate change diverged with the company’s public 
statements.163 This inconsistency may violate California’s securities and 
environmental laws.164 Harris won her bid for U.S. Senate in November 
2016, and resigned from the office of the Attorney General.165 On January 
24, 2017, former member of the House of Representatives Xavier Becerra 
was sworn in as California’s new Attorney General.166 A couple of weeks 
later, members of Congress including Ted Lieu, Mark DeSaulnier, Jared 
Huffman, and Zoe Lofgren sent a letter to Becerra, urging him to continue 
the investigation into ExxonMobil.167 
In March 2016, Attorneys General Maura Healey of Massachusetts and 
Claude Walker of the U.S. Virgin Islands also announced investigations into 
ExxonMobil’s knowledge of climate change at a news conference which 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Ivan Penn, California to Investigate Whether ExxonMobil Lied About Climate-Change 
Risks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-exxon-global-
warming-20160120-story.html [https://perma.cc/AX6B-4WRW]. 
 162 Id. Commenting on the potential strength of cooperative action among states’ Attorneys 
General, Missouri assistant attorney general Chuck Hatfield compared New York and California 
to “small countries,” noting that “all of the states look to them to see what they are doing” for 
potential leadership. Jenny Anderson, New Cops on the Beat, INST. INV’R (July 1, 2002), http://
www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/1027367/new-cops-on-the-beat.html#.VtTyuZMrJE4 [http://
perma.cc/4GEF-RKW2]. 
 163 Penn, supra note 161. 
 164 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 2016) (prohibiting fraudulent or misleading 
actions or statements in the sale of securities); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21083.05 (West 2016) 
(creating the obligation for the Office of Planning and Research and the Natural Resources Agen-
cy to maintain guidelines for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in California). The reports of 
Harris’ investigation failed to mention any particular state or federal statute the California Attor-
ney General might rely on. Penn, supra note 161. 
 165 Patrick McGreevy, Assembly Sets Confirmation Hearing After Gov. Brown Formally 
Nominates Becerra as State Attorney General, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017, 10:07 AM),  http://www.
latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-gov-brown-formally-nominates-
rep-1483466541-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/B79G-KK3J]. 
 166 Attorney General Xavier Becerra, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://oag.ca.gov/
about [https://perma.cc/X33C-BWB9]. 
 167 Press Release, Rep. Huffman, Lofgren, Lieu, DeSaulnier, CA Members Urge Attorney Gen-
eral Becerra to Investigate ExxonMobil’s Role in Misleading Public on Climate Change (Feb. 6, 
2017), https://huffman.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-huffman-lofgren-lieu-desaulnier-
ca-members-urge-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/3SLC-S4PP]. 
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coincided with an Attorneys General climate change conference.168 Attor-
neys General from the District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mary-
land, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, 
Vermont, and Washington State also attended the conference, but did not 
officially announce investigations into ExxonMobil.169 Schneiderman sug-
gested that their presence at the climate change conference was indicative 
of support for the investigations, adding that not all investigations are publi-
cized.170 
Schneiderman said that the scope of climate change and the size of the 
energy companies are massive, and require a multistate effort to combat.171 
In the press conference, former Vice President Gore explicitly compared the 
joint action to the 1990s investigation of Big Tobacco,172 In response, Exx-
onMobil issued a statement saying the Attorneys General were politically 
motivated and the accusations were based on discredited news reports.173 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Schwartz, supra note 83; Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schnei-
derman, Former Vice President Al Gore and a Coalition of Attorneys General from Across the Coun-
try Announce Historic State-Based Effort to Combat Climate Change (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.
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States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit supporting the Clean Power Plan. Id. 
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identify as Democrats. David Hasemyer & Sabrina Shankman, Climate Fraud Investigation of Exx-
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insideclimatenews.org/news/30032016/climate-change-fraud-investigation-exxon-eric-shneiderman-
18-attorneys-general [https://perma.cc/BJ6W-NYHS]. 
 170 Schwartz, supra note 83. In August 2016, the Energy & Environmental Legal Institute and 
the Free Market Environmental Law Clinic sued Schneiderman, asking him to produce records 
between his office and any others that may be coordinating in the ExxonMobil investigation, in-
cluding Kamala Harris, climate activists, and environmental attorneys. Stan Parker, NY AG Sued 
for Emails on Climate Probe Coordination, LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2016, 6:43 PM), https://www.law
360.com/articles/824217/ny-ag-sued-for-emails-on-climate-probe-coordination [https://perma.cc/
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environmental activists before he opened the Martin Act investigation. Carl Campanile, Schnei-
derman Talked with Environmental Activists Ahead of Exxon Probe, N.Y. POST (Feb. 13, 2017), 
http://nypost.com/2017/02/13/schneiderman-talked-with-environmental-activists-ahead-of-exxon-
probe/ [https://perma.cc/CT2F-ZTUV]. 
 171 Hasemyer & Shankman, supra note 169. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Press Release, ExxonMobil’s Perspectives Blog, ExxonMobil Responds to State AGs, (Mar. 
29, 2016), https://energyfactor.exxonmobil.com/exxonmobil-responds-state-ags/ [https://perma.
cc/447V-HX9A?type=image]. Separately, the libertarian think tank Competitive Enterprise Insti-
tute filed a lawsuit against Schneiderman’s office at the end of August 2016, seeking to discover if 
the Attorneys General entered into an agreement to keep records uncovered in the investigations 
confidential by using New York’s Freedom of Information Law. David Hasemyer, Conservative 
Think Tank Sues Attorney General Over Exxon Documents, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Aug. 31, 
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B. Attorney General Walker and ExxonMobil Settle 
Claude Walker, the Attorney General for the U.S. Virgin Islands, served 
a subpoena on ExxonMobil in March 2016 based on its local anti-
racketeering law, the Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“CICO”).174 To allege a violation of CICO, the subpoena also necessarily 
alleged violations of the territory’s criminal fraud laws, which prevent false 
representation and conspiracy to obtain money.175 In early April, Walker sub-
poenaed the non-profit policy organization Competitive Enterprise Institute 
(“CEI”) and public relations and lobbying firm DCI Group for communica-
tions with ExxonMobil regarding its climate change studies.176 In mid-April 
2016, ExxonMobil responded to Walker’s subpoena by suing Walker’s office, 
claiming the subpoena is invalid because it extends beyond the statute of limi-
tations, violates the company’s constitutional rights of freedom of speech and 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, and constitutes an abuse of 
process.177 In May, the Virgin Islands successfully petitioned for the removal 
of the case to federal court because the company’s underlying conduct on 
which the state and federal claims were based are identical.178 Attorneys Gen-
eral Ken Paxton of Texas and Luther Strange of Alabama, both Republicans, 
joined the fray in July, joining the lawsuit as intervenors siding with Exx-
onMobil.179 
In late July, the two parties came to an agreement: ExxonMobil would 
drop its lawsuit, and the Virgin Islands would withdraw its subpoena.180 The 
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Virgin Islands also withdrew its subpoenas issued to CEI and the DCI 
Group.181 Walker said that the Virgin Islands would continue its cooperation 
with other states in investigating ExxonMobil.182 
C. Exxon Adds Fuel to the Fire by Suing Healey and Schneiderman 
Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey acted shortly after the 
joint statement of support in March, opening an investigation into Exxon-
Mobil on April 19, 2016 by issuing a civil investigative demand based on 
Exxon’s sale of fossil fuels and marketing and sales of securities.183 Healey 
alleged that these sales violated Massachusetts’ consumer protection stat-
ute.184 The investigation intended to seek “information whether Exxon may 
have misled consumers and/or investors with respect to the impact of fossil 
fuels on climate change.”185 
ExxonMobil responded on June 15, 2016 by filing a motion—in a case 
that was removed from a Texas state court to federal court—seeking to 
block the demand, calling it an abuse of power and biased against the com-
pany.186 On October 13, Judge Ed Kinkeade issued an order that concluded 
that Healey’s investigation may have been in bad faith, and allowed Exx-
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onMobil to proceed with its discovery request seeking internal communica-
tions surrounding the investigation, dismissing her request to dismiss the 
suit entirely.187  
The next week, ExxonMobil moved to join Schneiderman as a defend-
ant in the case, signaling the end of the company’s cooperation with the in-
vestigation.188 In a memo supporting the joinder, Exxon argued that Schnei-
derman’s purpose is politically motivated, and aimed at suppressing speech 
the Green 20 disagrees with.189 The company also moved to add claims of 
federal preemption and conspiracy.190 Judge Kinkeade allowed the joinder 
on November 10, 2016.191 The same day, ExxonMobil filed an amended 
complaint adding Schneiderman to the case, alleging the same complaints 
filed against Healey of unlawfully using his power for political reasons.192 
In November 2016, ExxonMobil sent letters to the Union of Con-
cerned Scientists and the Rockefeller Family Fund, warning the groups to 
preserve their communications for later potential discovery, presumably 
relying on Judge Kinkeade’s October 13 order allowing the company to 
proceed with discovery.193 ExxonMobil followed through on its threat, issu-
ing a subpoena to the Union of Concerned Scientists on November 7, 2016 
to access documents related to Healey and Schneiderman’s investiga-
tions.194  
On November 17, Judge Kinkeade ordered Healey and Schneiderman 
to appear before him for deposition on December 13, but on December 12, 
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he voided the order without explanation.195 In February 2017, ExxonMobil, 
Schneiderman, and Healey filed briefs arguing whether or not the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas has jurisdiction over 
the matter.196 
ExxonMobil filed a parallel lawsuit in the Suffolk Superior Court in 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in June 2016, seeking to block Hea-
ley’s investigation.197 In January 2017, Judge Heidi Brieger affirmed Hea-
ley’s authority to investigate the company, and ordered it to comply with the 
Attorney General’s investigative demand for its records.198  
D. The Science, Space, and Technology Committee Subpoenas 
Separately, in May 2016, the House Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology (the “Committee”) began an escalating series of requests to the 
Attorneys General investigating ExxonMobil.199 In a series of letters ad-
dressed to the seventeen Attorneys General, the Committee expressed its 
concern that the investigations were politically motivated, misaligned with 
an Attorney General’s duty to defend the rights of the people, and may con-
stitute an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.200 
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The letter cited media reports of an initial strategy meeting in 2012 and 
a January 2016 meeting with environmental activists held at the Rockefeller 
Family Fund, intended to formulate a strategy to convince the public that 
ExxonMobil has significantly contributed to climate change.201 The letter 
requested the Attorneys General to present documentation that would 
demonstrate their impartiality, including communications with the envi-
ronmental activist groups, communications among Attorneys General re-
garding the investigations, and communications between the Attorneys 
General’s offices and the executive branch regarding potential prosecution 
related to climate change.202 
Some states responded to question the Committee’s jurisdiction over 
the issue, but none of the Attorneys General provided substantive responses 
to the requests for communication.203 The Committee reiterated its request 
for information in letters sent to each Attorney General on June 17, 2016, 
explaining that its jurisdiction to investigate environmental matters stems 
from Congress’ constitutional power to legislate.204 The letters further elab-
orated that the Committee was established to aid the House of Representa-
tives in its oversight regarding environmental research and development.205 
On July 13, 2016, the Committee again escalated its opposition to the 
investigations by issuing a subpoena to Attorney General Eric Schneider-
man, Attorney General Maura Healey, and the eight environmental nonprof-
its to obtain any documents showing coordinated efforts to limit companies, 
nonprofit organizations, or scientists’ First Amendment freedoms.206 A 
spokeswoman for Healey suggested that Chairman of the Committee Lamar 
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Smith and the other Committee members were acting on behalf of Big Oil, 
and stated that the Committee’s subpoenas offended states’ rights.207 
Healey and Schneiderman’s general counsels each sent letters to La-
mar Smith on July 26, 2016, stating that they would not comply with the 
subpoenas.208 The letter from Schneiderman’s counselstated that the sub-
poena raises significant federal concerns and that such a subpoena from the 
House of Representatives to an Attorney General’s office was unprecedent-
ed.209 It also repeated the offer from Schneiderman’s office to meet with the 
Committee to discuss the investigations outside of a subpoena.210 The letter 
from Healey’s chief legal counsel called the subpoena unprecedented and 
unconstitutional, argued that the majority of the requested documents are 
protected by attorney-client privilege or as attorney work product, and 
faulted the Committee for ignoring her office’s offer to discuss the investi-
gations over a conference call.211  
Lamar Smith responded with a letter of his own on August 23, 2016, 
defending the subpoenas as respective of federalist principles and within its 
jurisdiction as a federal legislative body overseeing national scientific re-
search and its effects.212 On February 16, 2017, Smith reissued the subpoe-
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nas to Schneiderman and Healey.213 Neither Attorney General plans to com-
ply with the information request.214 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence supporting human-induced climate change is broadly ac-
cepted among scientists. Corporations have also largely come to accept that 
climate change poses risks to the way they operate. Energy companies in 
particular have a vested interest in the politics and popular perception of 
climate change research. Oil and gas companies funded a good deal of early 
climate change research, and these same companies have much lose if legis-
lative and regulatory initiatives limit their activities. 
While federal and state governments aim to limit corporations’ contri-
butions to climate change through statutes and regulations, there is also a 
steady attempt to pursue legal remedies that will hold those corporations 
accountable for their role in contributing to and accelerating climate 
change. By investigating ExxonMobil using the Martin Act, Eric Schnei-
derman follows his predecessors in the New York Attorney General’s office 
in seeking to catalyze more successful litigation through securities law. 
Schneiderman is particularly well situated to bring this case against 
ExxonMobil because of the unique power of the Martin Act. Its broad scope 
and low burdens, along with its civil and criminal penalties, equip Schnei-
derman with a powerful fact-finding tool. Whether or not ExxonMobil has 
been honest about its stance on climate change given available scientific 
research, the mere disclosure of previously confidential information alone 
can prove useful to other plaintiffs seeking to establish a case against Exx-
onMobil using common law or federal securities law. 
If Schneiderman’s Martin Act investigation proves successful, Spitzer’s 
overhaul of the financial industry provides a useful template for New York-
led regulation in cooperation with the SEC. Because the Martin Act has with-
stood judicial challenges regarding potential federal preemption, Schneider-
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man, the SEC, and other federal agencies may work together to bring more 
transparency to energy companies’ disclosures to investors and the public. 
The Master Settlement Agreement jointly entered by the majority of the Unit-
ed States’ Attorneys General and the four largest tobacco companies serves as 
another blueprint for a state-led initiative to litigate climate change. 
  
 
